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DOD use of commercial 5G networks entails unprecedented reliance on untrusted third-party communications infrastructure, including the 5G base stations that connect directly to 5G devices and the Internet infrastructure that underlies 5G communications.
The core problem when operating through unknown or non-cooperative commercial 5G infrastructure is that the unknown infrastructure potentially exposes communications to an adversary.
When communications traverse adversary-controlled infrastructure, it allows DOD’s sophisticated adversaries to recognize, disrupt, or extract intelligence from the communications. Even encrypted communications reveal the communicating source and destination IP addresses, which leaves the traffic remain vulnerable to advanced analysis techniques able to extract information directly from the encrypted data portion.
Disguising traffic in hopes of evading adversary detection may work at first, but such disguises create an arms race with ever more sophisticated disguises and advanced network intelligence techniques to detect them. With each new obfuscation attempt, DOD will never know if the disguise fools the adversary or if the adversary is simply lulling them into a false sense of security. Worse still, once an adversary learns DOD’s obfuscation approaches, the disguises themselves can unintentionally draw unwanted attention from that adversary.
Fundamentally, traffic obfuscation cannot provide meaningful security guarantees when the underlying infrastructure is an unknowable black box.